DEMOCRACY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE. THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LEVERS

Daniele Archibugi, Marco Cellini

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Questo paper esplora i metodi per introdurre strumenti democratici all’interno della global governance. La prima parte cerca di stabilire cosa sia un deficit democratico. La seconda parte fornisce alcuni punti di riferimento che permettono di identificare quando e come le organizzazioni internazionali, la parte più importante e visibile della global governance, corrispondono ai valori della democrazia. La terza parte presenta le leve interna ed esterna. La leva interna è definita come il modo in cui la democratizzazione all’interno dei paesi contribuisce a promuovere forme più trasparenti, responsabili e partecipative di global governance. La leva esterna è definita come il modo in cui le organizzazioni internazionali contribuiscono a promuovere la transizione democratica e il consolidamento tra i loro membri. Nè la leva interna nè quella esterna funzionano in modo efficace quando sono lasciati alla mera contrattazione intergovernativa. Una partecipazione attiva degli attori intergovernativi è necessaria al fine di rendere le leve efficaci. Il paper infine discute un elenco di proposte per rendere democratica la global governance.

Parole chiave: Global Governance, Democratizzazione, Leve Interna e Esterna

Democracy and Global Governance. The Internal and External Levers
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The paper explores the methods to introduce democratic devices in global governance. The first part makes an attempt to define what a democratic deficit is. The second part provides some benchmark to identify when and how international organizations, the most important and visible part of global governance, correspond to the values of democracy. The third part presents the internal and the external levers. The internal lever is defined as the ways in which democratization within countries helps to foster more transparent, accountable and participatory forms of global governance. The external lever is defined as the ways in which international organizations contribute to promote democratic transition and consolidation in their members. Neither the internal nor the external levers work effectively if they are left to inter-governmental bargaining only. An active participation of non-governmental actors is needed in order to make them effective. The paper finally discuss a list of proposals to democratize global governance.

Keywords: Global Governance, Democratization, Internal and External Levers
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Partisans of democracy have, at least, two discomforts when they observe the way in which our planet is ruled. The first is that not all countries of the world are democratic. The second is that decisions regarding everybody are not taken democratically, and the basic principle of democracy - namely that all individuals affected by decision-making should be involved - is not implemented. Some will phrase the same problems in terms of democratic deficit in global governance but, again, the notion can be elusive. According to a first meaning, there is a democratic deficit in global governance because the members of the international community, namely the states, are not sufficiently democratic. According to the second, the democratic deficit is due to the fact that global governance is not subjected to any democratic control. Even the institutions that have been designed with the purpose to increase legitimacy, transparency, and accountability to world politics, such as the international organizations (IOs), are not sufficiently democratic in their norms and procedures. The first meaning points out at an internal deficiency, the second to a deficiency of the international system.

Both these deficiencies are real and strongly constrain the full accomplishment of democracy. Internally, in spite of the democratic wave started in 1990s, half of the countries of the world do not have elected governments. Even part of the other half is not sufficiently democratic and that the march of democracy has still to make important steps within countries. Not only autocracies, but even the most consolidated democracies are rather reluctant to make their global choices accountable, even in front of their own citizens.

The constitutional structure of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) do not resemble at all democracy as we have seen it developed within states. The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organizations, just to mention a few of the most important IGOs, do not contemplate the election of public officers by the citizenry. Even the European Union, the IO that has been permeated by democratic values, has a constitution that is much less democratic than any of its members (Zurn 2000). Shall we consider the democratic deficit in global governance an issue that can be denounced but not solved, or is there something that can be done about it? And, above all, if we identify the existence of at least two areas in which democracy is not fully realized - the internal and the global - how are they connected?

This paper provides a modest contribution to highlight the linkages between the internal and the global dimension of the democratic deficit and to provide some suggestions for action. Changes introduced at the internal and at the global levels could have important effects on the other dimension. Of course, this is based on an assumption that it is worth declaring: we aim at a world composed by states that are internally democratic, and to global governance that reflects some of the values and norms of democracy. Or, to put in other terms, we aim at reaching together the globalization of democracy and the democratization of globalization. The paper is organized as follows. The next section addresses the issue of what we mean for democratic global governance. The following section questions the way in which democracy is assessed internally, arguing that the dominant measuring methods seem confined to the incumbent understanding of democracy. The subsequent sections are devoted to illustrate what we have labelled the internal and the external levers. For internal lever, we mean how the political
regime within countries can contribute to foster democratization of IOs. For external lever we mean how IOs can help the transition, consolidation and deepening of democracy within states. In each of these sections we have highlighted some prescriptions on how to use the internal and the external levers to achieve democratization within states as well as in IOs.

What is democratic global governance?

As already indicated by Anna Triandafyllidou there are several and contested definitions of global governance. We find close kinship with the following definition: “the political actions undertaken by national and/or transnational actors aimed at addressing problems that affect more than one state and/or where there is no defined political authority able to address them” (Koenig-Archibugi 2002). Political parties, public administrators, the business sector and the public opinion at large often demands that global issues are addressed through appropriate actions and levels of decision making. When these demands are addressed by individual states, non-governmental actors or a group of states, at least one of the following conditions should be at work:

1) The issue in question is not limited to an individual state;
2) The possibility to address successfully the issue is facilitated by the participation of political players based in more than one state.

Global governance is often evoked for timely and effective decisions. For example, during and after the financial crisis of autumn 2008, the business sector, trade unions and the public opinion demanded an effective intervention to prevent a collapse of economic activities. Governments with the largest financial reserves undertook a series of coordinated actions to prevent the financial crisis to further blaze up. Many of these decisions have been taken in G8, G20, G4 or G2 Summits. This can be considered a case of effective global governance, even if not many parameters of democracy were satisfied: a selected number of governments took part to the negotiation, deliberation was far from being transparent, and the outcome was not accountable to citizens.

While the relevance of global governance has grown exponentially in the last decades (see Held and McGrew 2002; Woods et al. 2013), this does not necessarily mean that we are approaching a democratic form of global governance. This is also related to the fact that there is no shared definition of what democratic global governance is. Most of the debate has been rather explorative, with scholars, policy advisers and policy makers providing indications about what democratic global governance should be, and others arguing that democratic global governance is either impossible or not desirable (for a collection of different views, see Archibugi 2003; Archibugi et al. 2011).

When in the early 1990s David Held and Archibugi Daniele, among others, made a first attempt to explore under which conditions democratic values and norms could be expanded also to global governance, we were implicitly convinced that we were just expanding democratic theory and that there would have been a general consensus among democrats about the project (Archibugi and Held, 1995). It was therefore with great surprise and disappointment that we
realized that some theorists from whom we learnt about democracy were rather sceptical on its expansion beyond states. In particular, Robert Dahl, one of the most important democratic theorists of the second half of the XX century, rejected the possibility to achieve democracy beyond states (Dahl 1999; 2005).

The real problem is to understand to what extent the domestic analogy is valid when we deal with democracy beyond borders. Not all democratic procedures applied within states can be expanded at the planetary scale. The strict application of the state system to the global level will lead to develop a world federal state. World federalism is an important line of thought, which contributed to the transformation of international organizations and provided fresh ideas for a more integrated world order (see Cabrera 2004; Levi 2008; Marchetti 2008). But the programme of democratizing global governance does not need to reach the “full Monty” of a world federal state. The programme is more modest and hopefully more achievable, namely to increase democratic devices in global governance even in absence of a final concentration of force in a world state.

Not all global governance is provided by IOs. In fact, there are important decisions that are taken in non-transparent places and for which it is even difficult to gather accurate information. In this paper, we will focus on IGOs since they are the most visible component of global governance. Even when power, legitimacy and resources are provided by their members, IGOs have their own agency and they cannot be considered just governments’ “agents”. In comparison to other forms of global governance, such as i) unilateral actions undertaken by individual states (e.g. unilateral development assistance), ii) bilateral or multilateral inter-governmental initiatives (e.g. financial coordination initiatives undertaken in the G7), or iii) the activities performed by the business sector (e.g. actions and regulations taken by industry associations), IGOs already incorporate some of the values and principles of democracy such as:

- IGOs are based on Charters, Conventions, Treaties and other public acts. This makes them bounded to the rule of law and, more particularly, to international law.
- Some IGOs have judicial methods to address controversies.
- Most of the activities carried out by IGOs are transparent.
- IGOs activities are accountable to member states and to the public opinion at large.

Are these elements sufficient to consider IGOs democratic institutions? Certainly they are more legitimate than suitable alternatives, such as summits held behind closed doors or decisions taken by a group of business CEOs (Buchanan and Keohane 2006). But these criteria are highly insufficient if matched against the requirements of democratic theory. The criteria listed above will certainly not be sufficient to qualify any state as democratic (Patomaki and Teivainen 2004; Zweifel 2005; Levi et al. 2014). It is therefore not surprisingly that Dahl (1999, 2005) has challenged the idea that IOs could ever be democratic institutions. Dahl has indicated a few key criteria that qualify the modern term “democracy” in order to show that none of them is fully applied in IOs (see the left column of Table 1). But the fact that IOs do not currently satisfy democratic criteria should not imply that they could satisfy them if appropriately reformed.

What can be done and how the operation of international institutions can improve? As indicated in the right column of Table 1, all criteria named by Dahl have also implications for
IOs and global governance, and if taken into account may help to increase accountability, legitimacy and responsiveness. But this is a partial answer only since Dahl’s criteria rely on a domestic analogy, under the implicit assumption that the democratization of global governance should replicate the political regime we have experienced within countries.

Table 1 - Democratic criteria indicated by Robert Dahl and their possible expansion to international organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dahl’s democratic criteria</th>
<th>Possible extension to international organizations</th>
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<tr>
<td>“Final control over important government decisions is exercised by elected officials”</td>
<td>For some areas it is possible to envisage elected officials (for example through a World Parliament). Elected officials can also be appointed for activities where IGOs have a strong territorial activity (health, food, refugees). But to generalize the principle will lead to a world federal state</td>
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<tr>
<td>“These officials are chosen in free, fair and reasonably frequent elections”</td>
<td>The electoral principle may be applied at various levels. Other forms of democratic participation can also be conceived</td>
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<tr>
<td>“In considering their possible choices and decisions, citizens have an effective right and opportunity to exercise extensive freedom of expression”</td>
<td>Since freedom of expression is often repressed by authoritarian governments, IGOs could also protect individual freedom of expression and provide the instruments to exercise it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Citizens also have the right and opportunity to consult alternative sources of information that are not under the control of the government or any single group of interest”</td>
<td>Most information and media are still national in scope. Attempts to generate a regional or global public opinion have so far limited effect. But media are more and more globalizing even without explicit political request. World broadcasts and social networks provide a variety of information channels that are more difficult to be kept under government control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“In order to act effectively, citizens possess the right and opportunities to form political associations, interest groups, competitive political parties, voluntary organizations and the like”</td>
<td>National political life can be expanded also at trans-national level. Political parties, trade unions and NGOs have already linkages across borders and they are already increasing their significance. Strengthening global institutions may also lead to a reorganization of political interests and delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“With a small number of permissible exceptions, such as transient residents, all adults who are subject to the laws and policies are full citizens who possess all rights and opportunities just listed”</td>
<td>The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights already provides equal individual rights. A cosmopolitan citizenship, even if granted by states (as in the EU case) may extend political equality to the inhabitants of the planet and strengthen their rights vis-à-vis their governments</td>
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We need a more general theory of democracy that is not based on states but that is applicable to a variety of different human contexts (e.g. families, companies, neighbourhoods, political associations) as well as to organizations above the state. In particular, we need to start from political procedures that are not based on the concentration of force in a single institution. Drawing on the insights of Norberto Bobbio (1987) and David Beetham (1999), we suggested that democracy can be understood in more general terms than those described by Dahl. The three principles on which democracy is based are (see Archibugi 2008):
1) Nonviolence in the way public choices are made;
2) Popular control over public decision making and makers;
3) Political equality among citizens in the participation and exercise of control.

Such a definition of democracy does not rely on the existence of a “government” or on “statehood” and it seems more helpful to introduce notions of democracy also at the global level. Concerning the core of global governance, e.g. IGOs, Table 2 illustrate to what extent these principles are already applied and what is the potential application. It emerges that these principles can inspire a range of political actions that can be transforming all IGOs.

**Table 2 - Democratic principles and intergovernmental organizations.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic principles</th>
<th>Their current application in IGOs</th>
<th>Democratic reform of IGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolence</td>
<td>Commitment of member state to address peacefully international conflicts and to use force for self-defence only</td>
<td>Enforcement of the nonviolence principle through i) compulsory jurisdiction of the international judicial power ii) individual criminal responsibility for international crimes iii) humanitarian intervention to guarantee the security of peoples threatened by genocide and major human rights violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Control</td>
<td>Control exercised by member governments Publicity and transparency of acts Norms and procedures codified in International Treaties, Covenants, Charters, and Statutes</td>
<td>Expansion of political control through a World Parliament, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and other peoples' representatives Open the rooms of IGO to global civil society and its NGOs Monitoring of national governments by cosmopolitan institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political equality</td>
<td>Formal equality of states Equality of citizens in terms of rights sanctioned by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
<td>Equality of states on a substantial rather than formal basis (involvement of states associated to the stake held) Political equality among citizens on the ground of a minimal list of rights and duties associated to cosmopolitan citizenship Direct participation in world politics through a directly elected World Parliament</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Archibugi (2008).

A serious attempt to identify and assess how international institutions do confirm to the rules of democracy has been carried out by Levi and his colleagues (Levi et al. 2014) at the International Democracy Watch. They have taken into account a variety of IOs and checked to what extent they satisfy ten macro-indicators (see Table 3). The criteria listed are even too many, and it is rather difficult to quantify them. The simple checklist of these criteria shows that there is a huge variety in the constitutional structure and practice of IOs, a variety that is much
larger than in states’ regimes. To list the criteria, however, is the first step since it will allow checking in which specific dimensions there is a perceived democratic deficit and what can be done to address it. The importance of these macro-indicators is that they allow a mapping that it is more complex than the simple dichotomy democratic / non-democratic. A simple dichotomy is not very fruitful for IOs since all have some democratic components and, at the same time, all of them are not satisfactorily democratic.

It should be stressed that the democratic level of IOs cannot be assessed on the ground of the internal components of its members only. The share of democratic member countries is not necessarily showing that the IO itself is governed according to democratic criteria. There is a specific dimension of procedures and participation in the IO that should be taken into account.

Table 3 – Macro-indicators to assess the level of democracy operating in International Organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro-indicator</th>
<th>Criteria taken into account</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appointment</td>
<td>How are top officials appointed? To what extent this follows an open discussion or is just a negotiation among member states? Are non-governmental players also involved in the discussion?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy at the national level</td>
<td>Is membership open to democratic states only? What is the level of democracy of the member countries? Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) have quantified it by looking at the scores of IOs members according to the classification of political regimes of Polity IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Input legitimacy</td>
<td>To what extent the actual operation and involvement of political organization beyond the mere inter-governmental sphere. For example, do transnational political parties and non-governmental organizations participate to setting the agenda of the IOs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Citizens ability to influence and participate in decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Capacity of citizens and civil society to check the political authority of the monitored organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-state democracy</td>
<td>The decision making machinery is based on i) consensus; ii) majority vote or iii) special privileges. If there are special privileges, such as veto power (e.g. UN Security Council) or quotas (e.g. IMF and World Bank) to what extent do they reflect the stake of individual countries in the issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supranationalism</td>
<td>The extent to which the IO is committed to promote the general interest of the citizens rather than those of the states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power limitation</td>
<td>To what extent within the organization there are effective checks and balances that may limit or moderate executive functions. What is the strength of judicial review and are there independent courts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>Are human rights part of the organization mandate? Does the IO exercise control on member countries over the human rights regime and how effective is it? Has the IO also enforcing capacity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output legitimacy</td>
<td>Does the organization concretely perform its constitutions functions? With what degree of success?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaboration on Levi et al. (2014).
Who is entitled to assess internal democracy?

As stated above, one of the meanings of democratic deficit is associated to the fact that not all countries are democratic or sufficiently democratic. When membership of IOs is discussed, internal issues become also of external concern. A country can be accepted in an IO also on the ground of its internal constitution: the EU, for example, does not accept member countries with the death penalty in vigour. The problem is that perceptions on how democratic a country is are subjective and assessment is often used as an international politics tool.

Experts in politics and international relations can help. Major efforts have been done to classify political regimes and to generate new metrics (for a review, see Munck 2009). The standard exercise is Polity IV, a source of information which allows to detect to what extent democracy has progressed as political regime. Figure 1 reports the evolution of political regimes since the end of WWII. The left vertical axe shows that since the end of the cold war the number of democracies has doubled, while authoritarian states have constantly been reduced. There is still a large intermediate category, anocracies, which have not yet democratized. In spite of the existence of different regimes, democracy is not only the political system existing in the majority of countries, but it has also grown so fast that, if it will continue to make proselytes at the same pace, very soon all countries of the world will be ruled democratically.

*Figure 1 – Global Trends in Governance, 1946-2013 - Regime type in states. Legend: Polity IV index is the average of the scores achieved by countries from -10 to +10. Total number of countries in 2012: 177*

Political regimes are not considered on a binary scale only, but on a continuous scale. As most of the attempts to quantify democracy within countries, Polity IV provides a metric in which individual countries are attributed a score from –10 (total lack of democracy) to +10 (total achievement of democracy). Taking into account the average scores achieved by the
monitored countries, as indicated by right vertical axe of Figure 1, it emerges that the quality of
democracy has also increased. 1990 emerge as the crucial year in two different respects since it
is the moment in which: i) democracies outnumber autocracies; ii) the average score for all
countries monitored starts to be above 0.

We may rightly challenge the definitions adopted to classify political regimes. All
classifications, including Polity IV, are debatable. If we go beyond the dichotomy
democracy/non-democracy and we try to get individual political regimes on a scale some results
will surprise us. The reader may be puzzled to discover that, according to Polity IV, Mongolia
gets a score of 10, while France and Belgium 9; that Venezuela has a score lower than
Colombia; that Cuba gets a -7 while Haiti a +5. Once the data for individual countries are
scrutinized, people unexperienced in the gentle art of quantitative comparative politics may
become sceptical about the possibility to classify with one single number the political regime of
a country. Of course, these classifications should be taken as first approximation to the study
and understanding of politics. In particular:

i) Rather than using a single value for a whole political system, it would be better to provide
a battery of indicators able to inform on a variety of dimensions. In some countries, the
critical obstacle to a proper democracy is a badly functioning judicial apparatus; in other
countries it is the lack of effectiveness of government actions; in others there are serious
problems of discrimination towards ethnic minorities. By using a single aggregate parameter,
the possibility to understand each political system is reduced, as are the possibility to learn
from good-practice experiences.

ii) These quantitative assessments generate a dangerous attitude in politicians and academics,
pundits and journalists, namely to believe that there is a unique model of democracy that can
fit to all countries and all situations. This approach is paradoxically the most anti-democratic
since it empowers external agents to decide what democracy should be internally. On the
contrary, democracy is essentially a bottom-up rather than a top-down approach. Successful
democracy building in Eastern Europe, Latin America, South-East Asia and Africa, has all
seen the active involvement of citizens to develop their own institutions and this has often
implied the generation of new forms of democracy. For example, the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa after the regime change in the early 1990s
followed procedures that were not experimented in consolidated democracies and that are at
odds with the traditional understanding of the judicial power in liberal democracies. But the
innovative form of reconciliation substantially helped the transition and the consolidation of
the new regime, up to the point that in less than twenty years has become a standard of
reference for many other transitions.

iii) The metric provided, not only by Polity IV, but also by other exercises such as Freedom
House, implicitly assume that there is the possibility to achieve a climax of democratic
practice. Some countries are likely to change regimes. For example, the analysis of a country
like Turkey helps to identify the major changes in political regimes that have taken place in
the last decades. But if we look at a consolidated democracy such as the United States (the nation where, by the way, the majority of these data are generated), the metric provides much less interesting results (Figure 2). Since 1946, the United States is coded as full democracy with a score equal to 10. There are at least two problems with such an assessment. First, if we take it for granted, it implies that democracy in the USA has not done any progress in 70 years. This is hardly the case: racial discrimination and civil liberties have considerably increased in the country. This leads to a second problem: if it is assumed that there is a “ceiling”, it means that the final level of democracy can be dictated in advance. But this is very much against the very nature of democracy, which should be interpreted as an open system able to identify new challenges and it should be able to achieve new targets.

In consolidated democracies there is often the attitude to consider their own regimes as at the benchmark with no need of further improvements. Again, this is based on a misunderstanding since democracy is an open regime which could continuously improve its working in terms of increased participation, more effective decision-making, deeper accountability and greater political equality among its members. Not all political regimes could claim to be democratic, and some regimes are certainly more democratic than others. But appropriate procedures should still be found to assess differences in political regimes and to identify the most suitable democratic form for each of them.

These issues should be carefully considered when IOs or other independent organizations provide an assessment of the democratic regime of countries. There is no case in which the membership to an IO has been officially accepted or denied because of the classification provided by Polity IV or similar exercises, although they may be influential in policy-making. Besides the metrics, it seems very relevant to assess not only how a political regime do correspond to a standard notion of democracy, but rather to what extent there is a genuine commitment to progress, in each historical condition, in the democratic avenue.

Figure 2 – Trend in Governance. United States and Turkey

Source: Elaboration on Polity IV.
The internal lever

This section will discuss how the internal political regime of member countries can influence the possibility to get more democratic global governance, while the subsequent section will explore the opposite causal link, namely how the participation to international organizations can foster and consolidate democracy within states.

The connection between the internal and the external democratic deficits can be illustrated with two different sets (see Figure 3). On the one hand, we have the political regime within states. This set change over time: the number of state increased, and their internal regime, as seen in Figure 1, is also evolving. The second set is represented by the institutions of global governance. Global governance is made by many different aspects, some of which are clearly identifiable, such as IOs, others are less visible, such as diplomatic negotiations, and others are secretive as intelligence. The two sets are clearly connected, and the way in which the members of the international community act is influencing global governance and viceversa. We label the internal lever the way in which changes in the number and the deepening of democracy in states influence the democratization of global governance. The internal level is both descriptive and prescriptive: on the one hand, we need to know when and how democratic regimes have contributed to the democratization of global governance. But we also need to wonder what they can do in order to make global governance more democratic.

Figure 3 – The Internal and the External Levers

There is one obvious way in which the internal lever has operated and it is the birth of IOs. IOs have been the offspring of Western democracies. The League of Nations, the United Nations, as well as the Fédération Internationale de Football Association, were created from the
impulse of democratic countries and leaders. If we assume, as stated above, that anyhow they represent an improvement over other forms of global governance, such as Summits, it can be said that one way in which the internal lever has operated is by the very creation of IOs. The willingness of democracies to participate in IOs is confirmed also for new democracies: Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) indicate that their propensity is higher than for non-democracies.

IGOs are generally all-inclusive and seldom have they discriminated according to the political regime of member countries. Actually, most of them accept members according to the principle of effective control over a given territory rather than to the legitimacy of their governments. For many years, the issue of the internal regime was not considered an issue on which IOs should interfere. The UN, the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO give equal dignity to countries with opposite regimes. So far, pressures exercised by IGOs over internal regimes have been more on the respect of human rights than on the introduction of democracy.

Given the heterogeneous membership of most IGOs, it is understandable that there is no consensus on their architecture. In principle, we should expect that, on the one hand, democracies are keen to replicate their internal system also in the IGOs. And, on the other hand, that authoritarian regimes are reluctant to introduce systems that would allow greater participation of the citizenry in the IGOs since this may lead to question why the same devices are not introduced domestically. If this were the case, there would be a full similarity between the internal regimes of states and the form of global governance they aspire to. But, as usual in international politics, we have often seen lack of congruence. Authoritarian regimes have often complained that the veto power in the Security Council is not democratic and have become unexpected supporters in IGOs of the same democracy that they deny to their subjects. The Soviet Union has supported decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s much more than many European consolidated democracies. Democratic regimes have often opposed to the expansion of more participatory global governance, especially if they have to share power and decision-making with non-elected governments. The internal regime of a country is not always a good predictor of the willingness of a government to support or obstacle the democratization of global governance.

Recent empirical research carried out by Jonas Tallberg and his colleagues (Tallberg et al. 2013; 2014) indicate that IOs have become more transparent, accountable and accessible to transnational actors. Transnational actors born and nurtured in democratic countries have provided a fundamental contribution to the transformation of IOs. It is easy to understand why transnational actors in authoritarian countries have so little access IOs. We can speculate that one of the integral components of democratic regimes is to accept the existence of a vibrant civil society, even when it has positions that are different from those of the incumbent governments, while authoritarian regimes repress opposition. It is worth noting, however, that the opening up of IOs has been driven by transnational actors rather than by democratic governments. There are significant cases of NGOs that manage to interact across borders in defined areas (development aid, trade, human rights promotion) sometimes even in absence of deliberate inter-governmental agreements (for a case study, see Macdonald and Macdonald 2006).
We can wonder why democratic governments are often reluctant to expand their internal governance also globally. Here it lays a fundamental conundrum for democratic states: is it possible to introduce democratic devices in IOs even when many of its members are authoritarian? Norberto Bobbio wondered if it is possible to be democratic also with non-democratic regimes (Bobbio 1995). More specifically, the question that many democratic regimes had to face is: should a democratic state participate in democratic engagements with non-democratic states? Democracies may be reluctant to have more progressive arrangements if they are surrounded by autocracies. Of course, this is a benevolent explanation which implicitly assumes that democratic states would be willing to expand democratic checks and balances with like-minded states. It is an explanation that realists find risible, arguing that all states, democratic states included, do participate in IOs when they find them useful to serve their purposes (Morgenthau 1948).

The problem, however, should not be seen statically only. Dynamically, we have a context in which the internal regimes of states (Set A of Figure 3) have changed dramatically as a consequence of the democratic wave started in 1990: democracies are now the largest groups and their political power and influence is much larger. In spite of this major change in internal regimes the impact on IGOs has been rather limited. It is true that the UN, the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO have started to be more transparent and willing to receive inputs and suggestions from NGOs, but it is certainly disappointing that no major constitutional reform has been introduced. The internal lever has proven to be too weak.

What can democratic governments do within IOs with heterogeneous membership, to make them more representative and accountable? There are a large number of actions that can serve the double purpose of increasing democratic devices in IOs while also helping to foster internal democratization. A few examples are provided below.

- Use IOs rather than secretive governance agreements. The first thing for democratic governments is to use transparent and accountable forms of governance rather than secretive structures when dealing with global issues. WikiLeaks and Snowden have clearly shown that democratic governments use illegitimate and illegal methods in international politics as much as autocratic governments. The devolution of global issues to designed institutions will definitely move in the direction of democratizing global governance. Past and recent experience shows, however, that to constrain democratic governments from using illegitimate methods in international politics an active and robust participation of the public opinion is needed.

- The creation of international parliamentary assemblies (IPAs). Democratic governments should use their political weight to strengthen the political role and representativeness of IPAs. As other chapters in this volume clearly demonstrate, there has been an increase of IPAs in IOs, especially in regional organizations. A recent enquire has surveyed as many as 100 IPAs (Kissling 2014). With the notable exception of the European Parliament, none of these assemblies is directly elected by citizens, while their members are generally elected by national parliaments (i.e. MPs of national parliaments that are nominated also to serve in the
IPAs). In spite of this limitation, IPAs help to increase legitimacy of IOs since the activities of the latter are scrutinized not only by governments. Since members of the national legislative assemblies are selected from both governmental and opposition political parties, there is an increase in transparency and accountability. It is certainly surprising that several IPAs have members from countries without elected domestic parliament (as in the case of the Inter-Parliamentary Union). In spite of this severe limitation, IPAs add an important dimension to IOs democratization and, in perspective they can be reformed to be directly elected by citizens.

- Give more voice to international judicial devices. Democratic governments should promote the role of international judicial devices. Independent judicial review is a fundamental component of modern democracies. Judicial procedures are also very important for the peaceful settlement of conflicts. As in the case of IPAs, the number of international tribunals has constantly grown (for a review, see, Mackenzie et al. 2010). A greater role and power to judicial review will certainly increase the legitimacy of IOs, especially if states are prepared to accept their jurisdiction. Several states have accepted the mandatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) if called by states that have also accepted it. Other states have been more daring and have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ regardless what actual or prospective counterparts have done. The underlying assumption is that some countries are willing to respect the rule of law (and the rulings of independent Courts) regardless the internal regime of their counterpart. An honest person does not feel authorized to steal the wallet to a robber, and likewise a democracy should respect the rule of law even when it has a controversy with an autocracy.

- Opening access to NGOs and civil society. Democratic governments should also allow a more prominent role for NGOs and civil society. Over the last twenty years, IOs have become much keener to open their doors to NGOs (Tallberg et al. 2013). Democratic countries tend to be more open to NGOs since they already are already familiar with the internal pressure that lobbies, unions, and civil society exercise on governments. The larger the number of democracies, the more it is likely that they will give space to NGOs and other non-governmental players in IOs. In selected areas ranging from human rights to climate change, IOs have substantially changed their focus as a consequence of a major involvement of non-state and transnational actors.

The external lever

Do IOs have positive effects on the democratization of states? This is what we will call the external lever. IOs should not necessarily conform to democratic rules to have a positive effect on the political regime of their member countries (for a review, see Koenig-Archipibi 2015). It is possible to single out at least four ways in which IOs can actually promote internal democratization (Pevehouse 2002).

First, IOs can play a crucial role in the transition from authoritarian to democratic regime. Incumbent authoritarian governments are often reluctant to give up their power because they are
uncertain about their future. They may fear that if opposite political groups access the government they will impose their own dictatorship rather than a liberal regime. The incumbent authoritarian forces are more likely to step aside if they envisage a political space as opposition political party and if they are guaranteed that the coming democratic regime will allow government changes associated to free and recurrent elections. Membership in IOs helps to provide a “centre of gravity” (Pevehouse 2002) where all governments may act as brokers to guarantee the non-use of violence of the incumbent government against oppositions.

Second, IOs are often called as brokers in young and weak democracies, where there is still a fundamental lack of trust among political factions. For example, IOs have been more and more active in contributing in election organization and monitoring, up to the point that it is emerging as a new norm (see Kelley 2012). A rather young IO, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) has frequently helped countries in designing their electoral systems and other IOs have been active as election monitors. Several IOs, especially at the regional level, have helped in election monitoring with various degrees of success (see Lean 2007).

Third, IOs are also a form of transmission of knowledge on democratic governance and its institutions (Torfason and Ingram 2010). IOs can help national political parties, professional associations, and the public opinion to learn how to organize controversies in an agonistic rather than an antagonistic format. Often, IOs also play a more active role in providing expertise and training to public and private institutions. During democratic transitions, IOs have helped to train or re-train the police, the judicial system, and the media. Particular important is the role played in socializing the military, the typical institution on which authoritarian regimes are based. Within IOs, the military forces of transition countries can learn from their colleagues in democratic regimes what their role is in a democratic society.

Fourth, IOs provide material advantages to current and prospective members. These advantages range from free trade agreements, security cooperation, and cooperation in cultural, scientific and technological domains. Of course, the largest the incentives the more IOs will be helpful. When IOs are dominated by democratic countries, they will have a powerful instrument to persuade other members to introduce democratic reforms.

The external lever in the European Union

The most important case of effective external lever is represented by the European Union. In the EU, the external lever operated through a two-stages process: prospective members had first to achieve internal democratization and then they could join the EU. The external lever worked in the EU through a promise that the institutions makes to prospective member: consolidate your democracy and the new members will be taken on board with equal dignity.

In at least two moments of its history the EU has played a crucial role in promoting democratization in prospective member countries in all four ways. The first is when Southern European countries still run by dictatorship moved back to democracy. Portugal (1974), Greece (1974) and Spain (late 1970s) have enormously benefited from the EU during their transition from authoritarian to democratic government. The public opinion in these countries looked at democratic European countries as a viable and desirable political model, also because they offered superior economic and social systems. In Greece, economic lobbies moved against the
dictatorship also because they wanted to join the European Common Market. In Spain, the attempts to return to dictatorship in 1981 and 1982 were contrasted also because this would have implied in the inability to joining the EU (see Whitehead 2001).

The second case occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall. It was not obvious what would have been the political future of Central and Eastern European countries. The strategy of the EU was forward-looking: there was a general consensus that these countries should have been integrated both economically and politically. EU member countries had to face several short-term disadvantages to accommodate new members. From the economic viewpoint, foreign direct investments inflows would have chosen not only the old EU countries, but also Central and Eastern European countries and this was particularly damaging for the relatively low-wage economies of Southern Europe. From the social profile, older EU countries had to face important migration flows. But the EU members and their citizens believed that the advantages of integrating new countries, especially from the political viewpoint, were much greater than the short-term economic and social adjustment costs.

An impressive characteristic of the EU is that new members acquire, at least formally, the very same rights than the most established members. In the European Parliament the number of EMPs of a country like Rumania, a nation that joined the EU in 2007 only, is higher than the Netherlands, one of the founders of the Union, because seats are adjusted according to population. Although larger and powerful countries have more political weight than newcomers, procedurally each member is equal.

The EU has been the most successful case of external lever, but it will be difficult to replicate such a successful case in other regions of the world. The signing countries of the Treaty of Rome (1957) instituting the European Economic Community were already stable democracies and the first enlargement to the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark in 1973 further contributed to create a club of experienced democracies. When Greece, Spain and Portugal joined (in 1981 and in 1986) there was already a rather consolidated structure, and the EU was in the position to provide substantial economic and social benefits to newcomers. Even when seven post-communist countries were admitted with the fifth enlargement (2004 and 2007), the centre of gravity of consolidated democracies was stable enough to accommodate them and to demand in advance that the newcomers should strengthen their democratic regime. Other regions of the world, unfortunately, lack such a well-established centre of gravity.

*The external lever in Latin America*

In Latin America most of the countries have shifts from dictatorship to democracy and viceversa in several occasions. The latest and substantial democratic wave affected numerous nations in the same period and most of them moved from dictatorship, dictablanda, democradura, and eventually democracy in a relatively short number of years. Differently than in the EU, there was not in Latin America a group of countries with already consolidated democracy able to lead the dance. Within the Americas, the United States was the most obvious candidate for both its internal structure and its economic and political power, but it was not authoritative enough because of the support it provided to authoritarian regimes for many decades.
The lack of a powerful regional union also implied that nobody was able to offer solid economic incentives to “attract” other countries towards democracy. In spite of that, a variety of regional and sub-regional organizations helped very much in generating in the continent the idea that dictatorship was the past, and democracy the future. This was the path that the countries of the region started to undertake together in the new post-cold war climate and which was also facilitated by newly created or reinvigorated regional organizations.

It may be questioned what was the role of the Organization of American States (OAS). Founded in 1948, OAS should have been the champion of democracy since among its leading members there are also the two oldest democracies of Americas, the United States and Canada. The USA, in particular, could have played a role in democracy-promotion comparable to the invaluable role the nation had in restoring and supporting democracy in Europe and Japan after WWII. Unfortunately, the USA played a much more ambivalent role in Latin America until the end of the 1980s. The USA was keener to get reliable allied rather than democratic partners, up to the point to often support dictatorships against elected governments. The fact that the largest and consolidated democracy of the continent was so uncertain with democratic promotion in the Southern part often created deep resentments and anti-American feelings often ended up to be anti-democratic feelings. When in the 1990s the USA changed its strategy, this proved to be a decisive force towards democratic transition in the continent.

When the external lever does not work: the League of Arab States

Both Europe and Latin America are continents, in spite of the differences, where the external lever was effective in promoting and consolidating democracy. But not all regional organizations are equally successful. The League of Arab States (LAS) is an important case that shows the failure of a regional organization to promote internal democracy. The case is particularly interesting since LAS is as old as the United Nations (it was founded in 1945) and it is based on common culture, language and identity. In many aspects, the LAS is a rather democratic IO: there is equality among its members and mutual help against external intrusions. It has often been willing to discuss common issues and the organization has been rather effective in conflict resolution among its members (Caranti 2014). Moreover, some of its governments, thanks to the revenues from oil and gas, have also been able to provide important economic aid to neighbouring countries in difficulty and to Arab refugees.

But none of its members is a consolidated democracy and since its origin there was no country that could act as a democratic attractor. Even today, the majority of them have not elected governments. LAS is therefore a democratic association among authoritarian governments and internal democratization has never been one of its priorities. Very seldom human rights violation by incumbent governments has been an issue, while LAS has been much more active in denouncing hostile actions and human rights violations committed against Arabs by non-Arab countries. In front of democratic requests in member countries LAS has mostly been indifferent and, if any, more likely to align with the incumbent authoritarian government than with popular requests for democratization. If we read the history of the LAS, it emerges that it was an association among authoritarian incumbent governments helping each other against external intrusions, often effective in conflict resolution among its members. But it never had a specific focus on internal democratization.
What can be done to make the external lever more effective?

The external lever does not provide unique outcomes but it is a crucial vehicle for internal democratization. What can be done to make it more effective?

Explicit commitment of IOs for democratic consolidation. The explicit commitment for democratization by IOs can generate important internal implications. Pro-democratic political factions can find in IOs support and legitimacy that strengthen their internal bargaining power. The persuasions carried out by IOs have been more fruitful than the unilateral and coercive attempts of the 2000s to export democracy and that, so far, have failed to obtain a satisfactory transition in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Of course, some IOs have been more credible than others. As democratic ambassadors, the EU has been credible and effective, OAS less credible and the League of Arab States not credible at all. But a changing attitude is also noticeable. For example, the UN, an organization that born on the premise of non-interference in internal matters, has been much more active in democratic promotion. Two former Secretary-Generals, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, have explicitly committed the UN to foster regime change (Boutros-Ghali 1996; Annan 2002). The United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF), in spite of its very limited budget, especially in comparison to the military resources devoted to wars for democracy, indicates a commitment to work with countries towards democratic transition and consolidation.

Use IGOs to develop linkages across civil societies. Empirical research has already clearly indicated that, when IGOs allow an active role to NGOs, they generate positive effects on their transparency and accountability. But IGOs can also be an institutional setting where NGOs, especially those acting in authoritarian countries, can acquire international recognition and legitimacy. Greater use of fora of NGOs within IGOs can therefore substantially strengthen pro-democratic forces in authoritarian countries.

Greater use of the incentives provided by IGOs. Outside the EU, not many other IOs have been willing to use their resources as soft incentives for democratic transition and consolidation. This can be explained by the fact that most of the IGOs do not discriminate members according to their regime. While in the EU the most powerful bargaining chip has been membership, and this has never been granted to countries below a certain threshold of democracy, the same cannot be said for most other IGOs. The economic institutions, the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, are firmly dominated by consolidated democracies. In spite of that, the attempts made to use soft incentives to promote democracy or even to protect human rights have been rather mild.

Equal dignity among members. Political regimes under transformation are particularly sensitive to the role that their countries will acquire in the international context, IGOs included. In many countries, the possibility to acquire equal dignity in setting a common agenda can often be a decisive force. The case of the EU has shown how this was a crucial factor to induce élites to abandon authoritarian regimes and to embrace the democratic faith.
Conclusions

In this paper we have tried to highlight that there are two democratic deficits: the internal and the external. More importantly, the two are strongly interconnected. We have pointed out at two different casual devices:

- How democracies contribute to make global governance more democratic; what we have labelled the internal lever.
- How IOs can help internal democratization of its actual and prospective member countries, what we have labelled the external lever.

Both of them could be quite powerful. In particular, the internal lever has proved a decisive factor in organizing global governance through IOs rather than through more secretive forms, such as underground summits or diplomacy. However, we have also noted that the effect of the internal lever over the last quarter of a century has been far too weak: democratic countries have increased, the quality of democracy in many countries has also improved and, in spite of that, IOs have not changed dramatically their operations. They have started to be more accountable to NGOs and other institutions, but we have not experienced democratic constitutional reforms in spite of the fact that they have been advocated by quite a large number of senior officers (see, for example, Boutros-Ghali 1996; Annan 2002; Lamy 2005). We have also noted another important aspect, namely that success stories are not associated to the agency of democratic governments, but rather by powerful pressures by NGOs and other organizations of civil society. While democratic governments have been willing to receive suggestions and to transmit them inside IGOs, they have seldom be a driving force of democratization of global governance unless duly pushed by NGOs and civil society.

We have also explored how IOs can act as agents for internal democratization. Even if it cannot be given for granted, there are several cases in which they have managed to operate effectively for democratic transition and consolidation. We have also singled out two typologies of IOs. The first is centred on the EU, made of democratic states only and that has managed to be an invaluable “attractor” for neighbouring countries. Other regional organizations, especially in Latin America, had a lower impact, also because they had lower incentives and because the democratic “centre of gravity” has, so far, been much weaker. Even in this case, it emerges the crucial role played by NGOs and civil society: in many cases IOs have been the facilitator for establishing trans-national linkages among societal groups (e.g. the judiciary, the military, the local governments, the press, the trade unions) which have helped to disseminate democratic norms and procedures.

We have also indicated some policy actions that could be taken to make these levers more effective. The internal and the external levers are clearly connected in their effects, but too often elected governments are not willing to pursue consistently their democratic nature also in global governance. The muscular approach to democratization magnified with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq has seriously undermined the moral and political authority of Western democracy and has led to a decade of uncertainties on what should be the role of liberal states to advance an accountable and legitimate world order. It is now the time to work on how involvement and participation may bring the internal and global reforms needed to unbind the democratic potential.
References


