Majority rules and coalitional stability

Currarini, Sergio and Marini, Marco (2012) Majority rules and coalitional stability. Technical Report. Department of Computer, Control, and Management Engineering Antonio Ruberti.


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We consider a class of symmetric games with externalities across coalitions and show that, under certain regularity conditions, restricting the deviating power to majority guarantees the existence of core-stable allocations. We also show that if majorities can extract resources from minorities, stability requires a supermajority rule, whose threshold is increasing in the extraction power.

Item Type: Monograph (Technical Report)
Subjects: 300 Scienze sociali > 330 Economia
Depositing User: Sapienza Università di Roma Dipartimento di Ingegneria informatica, automatica e gestionale
Date Deposited: 05 Feb 2013 16:25
Last Modified: 06 Feb 2013 13:44

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