Currarini, Sergio and Marini, Marco (2012) Majority rules and coalitional stability. Technical Report. Department of Computer, Control, and Management Engineering Antonio Ruberti.
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Abstract
We consider a class of symmetric games with externalities across coalitions and show that, under certain regularity conditions, restricting the deviating power to majority guarantees the existence of core-stable allocations. We also show that if majorities can extract resources from minorities, stability requires a supermajority rule, whose threshold is increasing in the extraction power.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Technical Report) |
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| Subjects: | 300 Scienze sociali > 330 Economia |
| Depositing User: | Sapienza Università di Roma Dipartimento di Ingegneria informatica, automatica e gestionale |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Feb 2013 16:25 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Feb 2013 13:44 |
| URI: | http://eprints.bice.rm.cnr.it/id/eprint/4393 |
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