Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations

Acocella, Nicola and Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni and Hughes Hallett, Andrew (2008) Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations. Working Paper. Dipartimento di Studi Geoeconomici, Linguistici, Statistici e Storici per l'Analisi regionale, Università di Roma La Sapienza, Roma, Italia, Roma. (Submitted)


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This paper shows the relationship between static controllability (the well-known Tinbergen golden rule), and the existence and other properties of the Nash equilibrium in a dynamic setting with rational expectations for future behavior. We show how to determine the existence of equilibrium outcomes; the conditions under which no equilibrium exists; and who will get to dominate (or who will find their policies to have become ineffective) in those equilibria, without having to compute and enumerate all the possible equilibria directly.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Additional Information: JEL Classification: C72, E52, E61
Uncontrolled Keywords: Policy games, policy effectiveness, controllability, Nash equilibrium existence, rational expectations
Subjects: 300 Scienze sociali > 330 Economia
Depositing User: Prof. Nicola Acocella
Date Deposited: 16 Jul 2009
Last Modified: 20 May 2010 12:02
URI: http://eprints.bice.rm.cnr.it/id/eprint/988

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