Acocella, Nicola and Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni and Hughes Hallett, Andrew (2008) Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations. Working Paper. Dipartimento di Studi Geoeconomici, Linguistici, Statistici e Storici per l'Analisi regionale, Università di Roma La Sapienza, Roma, Italia, Roma. (Submitted)
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Abstract
This paper shows the relationship between static controllability (the well-known Tinbergen golden rule), and the existence and other properties of the Nash equilibrium in a dynamic setting with rational expectations for future behavior. We show how to determine the existence of equilibrium outcomes; the conditions under which no equilibrium exists; and who will get to dominate (or who will find their policies to have become ineffective) in those equilibria, without having to compute and enumerate all the possible equilibria directly.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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| Additional Information: | JEL Classification: C72, E52, E61 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Policy games, policy effectiveness, controllability, Nash equilibrium existence, rational expectations |
| Subjects: | 300 Scienze sociali > 330 Economia |
| Depositing User: | Prof. Nicola Acocella |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Jul 2009 |
| Last Modified: | 20 May 2010 12:02 |
| URI: | http://eprints.bice.rm.cnr.it/id/eprint/988 |
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