Marini, Marco and Rodano, Giorgio (2012) Sequential vs Collusive Payoffs in Symmetric Duopoly Games. Technical Report. Department of Computer, Control, and Management Engineering Antonio Ruberti.
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Abstract
In many strategic settings comparing the payo¤s obtained by players under full cooperation to those obtainable at a sequential (Stackelberg) equilibrium can be crucial to determine the final outcome of the game. This happens, for instance, in repeated games in which players can break cooperation by acting sequentially, as well as in merger games in which firms are allowed to sequence their actions. Despite the relevance of these and other applications, no fully-fledged comparisons betwen collusive and sequential payo¤s have been performed so far. In this paper we show that even in symmetric duopoly games the ranking of cooperative and sequential payoffs can be extremely variable, particularly when the consuete linear demand assumption is relaxed. Not surprisingly, the degree of strategic complementarity and substitutability of players'actions (and, hence, the slope of their best-replies) appears decisive to determine the ranking of collusive and sequential payoffs. Some applications to endogenous timing are discussed.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Technical Report) |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Sequential Payoffs; Collusion; Duopoly Games |
| Subjects: | 300 Scienze sociali > 330 Economia |
| Depositing User: | Sapienza Università di Roma Dipartimento di Ingegneria informatica, automatica e gestionale |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Feb 2013 16:33 |
| Last Modified: | 05 Feb 2013 16:33 |
| URI: | http://eprints.bice.rm.cnr.it/id/eprint/4398 |
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