Basili, Marcello and Franzini, Maurizio (2005) Cooperation and reciprocity: a theoretical approach. Working Paper. Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica, Università di Roma La Sapienza, Roma, Italia.
![[img]](http://eprints.bice.rm.cnr.it/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png)
|
PDF
Wp91.pdf Download (217kB) |
Abstract
Cooperation among genetically unrelated agents occurs in many situations where economic theory would not expect it. A too narrow conception of self-interest is widely considered the culprit. In particular, relying on experimental evidence in plenty, we consider strong reciprocity rules of behaviour, according to which it is worth bearing the cost of punishing those who defect, and we give analytical foundation to such behaviour – and more generally to cooperation-proneness. The basic idea is that most agents may include self-esteem in their utility function and actually produce or destroy self-esteem through their effective behaviour. The latter amounts to introducing a moral system in individual behaviour in such a way to make it amenable to rational maximization. We also show how the presence of cooperation-prone agents may impact on the best contract in Principal-Agents situations by altering the convenience of gift giving and trust.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | JEL Classification J41, D64 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | agency, altruism, self-interest, punishment, reciprocity |
| Subjects: | 300 Scienze sociali > 330 Economia |
| Depositing User: | Dipartimento economia e diritto |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Mar 2009 |
| Last Modified: | 20 May 2010 12:01 |
| URI: | http://eprints.bice.rm.cnr.it/id/eprint/810 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
