Ghignoni, Emanuela (2008) Temporary contracts, employees’ effort and labour productivity: the evidence for Italy. Working Paper. Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica, Università di Roma La Sapienza, Roma, Italia.
![[img]](http://eprints.bice.rm.cnr.it/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png)
|
PDF
Wp111.pdf Download (131kB) |
Abstract
This paper discusses the thesis (recently pointed out by empirical evidence on Swiss data) that, if temporary contracts are utilised by firms as a tool to screen potential new employees and provide workers with a “stepping stone” into permanent employment, then temporary employees have an incentive to provide more effort than their permanent colleagues. After a theoretical discussion, the paper focuses on the econometrical analysis of this thesis in an institutional context, like the Italian one, in which permanent workers are rather protected and firms are likely to use temporary contracts mainly to adjust the workforce during the cycle. Data are drawn from ECHP (1996-2001) for Italy and from ISFOL-Plus 2005. The paper concludes by pointing out that a higher effort does not necessary mean higher labour productivity, and suggests the necessary public policies to improve productivity in labour markets characterised by a growing rate of temporary jobs.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | JEL Classification: M51, J24, J28 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Temporary employment, Effort, Labour productivity, Job satisfaction. |
| Subjects: | 300 Scienze sociali > 330 Economia |
| Depositing User: | Dipartimento economia e diritto |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Mar 2009 |
| Last Modified: | 20 May 2010 12:01 |
| URI: | http://eprints.bice.rm.cnr.it/id/eprint/827 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
