Collective intentionality vs. Intersubjctive and social intentionality. An account of collective intentionality as shared intentionality

De Vecchi, Francesca (2011) Collective intentionality vs. Intersubjctive and social intentionality. An account of collective intentionality as shared intentionality. Phenomenology and mind (1). pp. 93-113. ISSN 2239-4028

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Abstract

I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, cognitive sciences and neurosciences debate, is often confused with similar yet diverse phenomena, i.e. with intersubjective intentionality, also called social cognition, and with social intentionality. In order to elucidate the phenomenon of collective intentionality, I shall present a taxonomy of collective, intersubjective and social intentionality, and consider a thesis about shared intentionality. The taxonomy intends to show that although collective, intersubjective and social intentionality are very close phenomena, nonetheless they are different types of intentionality, and that, like individual intentionality, collective and intersubjective intentionality involve different kinds of intentionality – practical, affective and cognitive – which have to be distinguished. The sharing thesis, I will argue for, maintains that collective intentionality is a shared intentionality in a very strong sense of the term “sharing”, a sense that implies some essential conditions, which are not required in the cases of intersubjective and social intentionality. Finally I shall point out that intersubjective intentionality is the basis and the necessary condition for collective and social intentionality.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: 100 Filosofia e Psicologia
Depositing User: Chiara Bisogno
Date Deposited: 09 Sep 2019 12:02
Last Modified: 09 Sep 2019 12:03
URI: http://eprints.bice.rm.cnr.it/id/eprint/4604

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