A Phenomenological discussion of antonio Damasio's theory of emotions

Bortolan, Anna (2011) A Phenomenological discussion of antonio Damasio's theory of emotions. Phenomenology and mind (1). pp. 179-188. ISSN 2239-4028

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Abstract

Antonio Damasio’s Theory of Emotions has deeply contributed to the understanding of the cognitive significance of affective states and of the relation between embodiment and cognition.Nevertheless, in this paper I argue that his account is inadequate from a phenomenological point of view. In the first place, I suggest that Damasio doesn’t provide a plausible analysis of the intentionality of emotions, ignoring both the intentional structure of feelings and the variety of objects they can be directed at. Secondly, I claim that by adopting a physiological approach to the study of emotions he can hardly account for their responsiveness to education and thus for the idea that it is possible to speak of responsibility also with regard to affective life. Besides,I suggest that Damasio doesn’t provide a plausible description of the way we become aware of other people’s affects, because he argues in favour of a separation between external behaviour and inner mental states.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: 100 Filosofia e Psicologia
Depositing User: Chiara Bisogno
Date Deposited: 09 Sep 2019 12:07
Last Modified: 09 Sep 2019 12:07
URI: http://eprints.bice.rm.cnr.it/id/eprint/4645

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